WAIC, but Why? Generative Ensembles for Robust Anomaly Detection by Choi, Hyunsun et al.
WAIC, but Why?
Generative Ensembles for Robust Anomaly Detection
Hyunsun Choi * Eric Jang * 1 Alexander A. Alemi 1
Abstract
Machine learning models encounter Out-of-
Distribution (OoD) errors when the data seen at
test time are generated from a different stochastic
generator than the one used to generate the train-
ing data. One proposal to scale OoD detection
to high-dimensional data is to learn a tractable
likelihood approximation of the training distribu-
tion, and use it to reject unlikely inputs. However,
likelihood models on natural data are themselves
susceptible to OoD errors, and even assign large
likelihoods to samples from other datasets. To
mitigate this problem, we propose Generative En-
sembles, which robustify density-based OoD de-
tection by way of estimating epistemic uncertainty
of the likelihood model. We present a puzzling
observation in need of an explanation – although
likelihood measures cannot account for the typi-
cal set of a distribution, and therefore should not
be suitable on their own for OoD detection, WAIC
performs surprisingly well in practice.
1. Introduction
Knowing when a machine learning (ML) model is qualified
to make predictions on an input is critical to safe deploy-
ment of ML technology in the real world. When training
and test distributions differ, neural networks may provide –
with high confidence – arbitrary predictions on inputs that
they are unaccustomed to seeing. This is known as the Out-
of-Distribution (OoD) problem. In addition to ML safety,
identifying OoD inputs (also referred to as anomaly detec-
tion) is a crucial feature of many data-driven applications,
such as credit card fraud detection and monitoring patient
health in medical settings.
A typical OoD scenario is as follows: a machine learning
model infers a predictive distribution p(y|x) from input
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x, which at training time is sampled from a distribution
p(x). At test-time, p(y|x) is evaluated on a single input
sampled from q(x), and the objective of OoD detection is
to infer whether p(x) ≡ q(x). This problem may seem ill-
posed at first glance, because we wish to compare p(x) and
q(x) using only a single sample from q(x). Nevertheless,
this setup is common when serving ML model predictions
over the Internet to anonymous, untrusted users, and is also
assumed in adversarial ML literature. Each user generates
data from a unique test set q(x) and may only request one
prediction.
One approach to OoD detection is to combine a dataset
of anomalies with in-distribution data and train a binary
classifier to tell them apart, or alternatively, appending a
“None of the above” category to a classification model. The
classifier then learns a decision boundary, or likelihood ratio,
between p(x) and the anomaly distribution q(x). However,
the discriminative approach to anomaly detection requires
q(x) to be specified at training time; this is a severe flaw
when anomalous data is rare (e.g. medical seizures) or not
known ahead of time, e.g. generated by an adversary.
On the other hand, density estimation techniques do not
assume an anomaly distribution at training time, and can
be used to assign lower likelihoods to OoD inputs (Bishop,
1994). However, we present a couple concerns about the
appropriateness of likelihood models for OoD detection.
1.1. Counterintuitive Properties of Likelihood Models
When p(x) is unknown, a generative model pθ(x), param-
eterized by θ, can be trained to approximate p(x) from its
samples. Generative modeling algorithms have improved
dramatically in recent years, and are capable of learn-
ing probabilistic models over massive, high-dimensional
datasets such as images, video, and natural language
(Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018; Vaswani et al., 2017; Wang
et al., 2018). Autoregressive Models and Normalizing
Flows (NF) are fully-observed likelihood models that con-
struct a tractable log-likelihood approximation to the data-
generating density p(x) (Uria et al., 2016; Dinh et al., 2014;
Rezende & Mohamed, 2015). Variational Autoencoders
(VAE) are latent variable models that maximize a varia-
tional lower bound on log density (Kingma & Welling, 2014;
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Rezende et al., 2014). Finally, Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GAN) are implicit density models that minimize a
divergence metric between p(x) and generative distribution
pθ(x) (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
Likelihood models implemented using neural networks are
susceptible to malformed inputs that exploit idiosyncratic
computation within the model (Szegedy et al., 2013). When
judging natural images, we assume an OoD input x ∼ q(x)
should remain OoD within some LP -norm, and yet a Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) attack (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) on the predictive distribution can realize extremely
high likelihood predictions (Nguyen et al., 2015). Con-
versely, a FGSM attack in the reverse direction on an in-
distribution sample x ∼ p(x) creates a perceptually identical
input with low likelihood (Kos et al., 2018).
An earlier version of this paper, concurrently with work by
Nalisnick et al. (2018), and Hendrycks et al. (2018) showed
that likelihood models can be fooled by OoD datasets that
are not even adversarial by construction. As shown in Fig-
ure 1, a likelihood model trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset
yields higher likelihood predictions on SVHN images than
the CIFAR-10 training data itself! For a flow-based model
with an isotropic Gaussian prior, this implies that SVHN
images are systematically projected closer to the origin than
the training data (Nalisnick et al., 2018).
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Figure 1. Density estimation models are not robust to OoD inputs.
A GLOW model (Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018) trained on CIFAR-
10 assigns much higher likelihoods to samples from SVHN than
samples from CIFAR-10. .
1.2. Likelihood and Typicality
Even if we could compute likelihoods exactly, it may not be
a sufficient measure for scoring OoD inputs. It is tempting to
suggest a simple one-tailed test in which lower likelihoods
are OoD, but the intuition that in-distribution inputs should
have the highest likelihoods does not hold in higher dimen-
sions. For instance, consider an isotropic 784-dimensional
Gaussian. A data point at the origin has maximum likeli-
hood, and yet it is highly atypical because the vast majority
of probability mass lies in an annulus of radius
√
784. Like-
lihoods can determine whether a point lies in the support of
a distribution, but do not reveal where the probability mass
is concentrated.
The main contributions of this work are as follows. First,
we observe that likelihood models assign higher densities
to OoD datasets than the ones they are trained on (SVHN
for CIFAR-10 models, and MNIST for Fashion MNIST
models). Second, we propose Generative Ensembles, an
anomaly detection algorithm that combines density estima-
tion with uncertainty estimation. Generative Ensembles
are trained independently of the task model, and can be
implemented using exact or approximate likelihood mod-
els. We also demonstrate how predictive uncertainty can
be applied to robustify implicit GANs and leverage them
for anomaly detection. Finally, we present yet another sur-
prising property of deep generative models that warrants
further explanation: density estimation should not be able to
account for probability mass, and yet Generative Ensembles
outperform OoD baselines on the majority of common OoD
detection problems, and demonstrate competitive results
with discriminative classification approaches on the Kaggle
Credit Fraud dataset.
2. Related Work
Anomaly detection methods are closely intertwined with
techniques used in uncertainty estimation, adversarial de-
fense literature, and novelty detection.
2.1. Uncertainty Estimation
OoD detection is closely related to the problem of uncer-
tainty estimation, whose goal is to yield calibrated confi-
dence measures for a model’s predictive distribution p(y|x).
Well-calibrated uncertainty estimation integrates several
forms of uncertainty into p(y|x): model mispecification
uncertainty (OoD detection of invalid inputs), aleatoric un-
certainty (irreducible input noise for valid inputs), and epis-
temic uncertainty (unknown model parameters for valid
inputs). In this paper, we study OoD detection in isolation;
instead of considering whether p(y|x) should be trusted for
a given x, we are trying to determine whether x should be
fed into p(y|x) at all.
Predictive uncertainty estimation is a model-dependent OoD
technique because it depends on task-specific information
(such as labels and task model architecture) in order to yield
an integrated estimate of uncertainty. ODIN (Liang et al.,
2018), MC Dropout (Gal & Ghahramani, 2016) and Deep-
Ensemble (Lakshminarayanan et al., 2017) model a cali-
brated predictive distribution for a classification task. Vari-
ational information bottleneck (VIB) (Alemi et al., 2018b)
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performs divergence estimation in latent space to detect
OoD, but is technically a model-dependent technique be-
cause the latent code is trained jointly with the downstream
classification task.
One limitation of model-dependent OoD techniques is that
they may discard information about p(x) in learning the
task-specific model p(y|x). Consider a contrived binary
classification model on images that learns to solve the task
perfectly by discarding all information except the contents
of the first pixel (no other information is preserved in the
features). Subsequently, the model yields confident predic-
tions on any distribution that happens to preserve identical
first-pixel statistics. In contrast, density estimation in data
space x considers the structure of the entire input mani-
fold, without bias towards a particular downstream task or
task-specific compression.
In our work we estimate predictive uncertainty of the scoring
model itself. Unlike predictive uncertainty methods applied
to the task model’s predictions, Generative Ensembles do
not require task-specific labels to train. Furthermore, model-
independent OoD detection aids interpretation of predictive
uncertainty by isolating the uncertainty component arising
from OoD inputs.
2.2. Adversarial Defense
Although adversarial attack and defense literature usually
considers smallLp-norm modifications to input (demonstrat-
ing the alarming sensitivity of neural networks), there is no
such restriction in practice to the degree with which an input
can be perturbed in a test setting. We consider adversarial
inputs in the broader context of the OoD problem, where
inputs can be swapped with other datasets, transformed and
corrupted (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019), or are explicitly
designed to fool the model.
Song et al. (2018) observe that adversarial examples de-
signed to fool a downstream task tend to have low likeli-
hoods under an independent generative model. They pro-
pose a “data purification” pipeline, where inputs are mod-
ified via gradient ascent on model likelihood before being
passing to the classifier. Their evaluations are restricted to
Lp-norm attacks on in-distribution inputs on the classifier,
and do not take into account that the generative model itself
may be susceptible to OoD errors. In fact, gradient ascent on
model likelihood has the exact opposite of the desired effect
when the input is OoD to begin with. In our experiments we
measure the degree to which we can identify adversarially
perturbed “rubbish inputs” as anomalies, and also note that
adversarial examples for IWAE predictions have high rates
under the latent code, making them suitable for anomaly
detection.
2.3. Novelty Detection
When learning signals are scarce, such as in reinforcement
learning (RL) with sparse rewards, the anomaly detection
problem is re-framed as novelty detection, whereby an agent
attempts to visit states that are OoD with respect to previous
experience (Fu et al., 2017; Marsland, 2003). Anomaly
detection algorithms, including our proposed Generative
Ensembles, are directly applicable as novelty bonuses for
exploration. However, we point out in Section 1.2 that
likelihoods are deceiving in high dimensions - the point of
highest density under a high-dimensional state distribution
may be exceedingly rare.
3. Generative Ensembles
We introduce Generative Ensembles, a novel anomaly de-
tection algorithm that combines likelihood models with
predictive uncertainty estimation via ensemble variance.
Concretely, an ensemble of generative models that com-
pute exact or approximate likelihoods (autoregressive mod-
els, flow-based models, VAEs) are used to estimate the
Watanabe-Akaike Information Criterion (WAIC).
3.1. Watanabe Akaike Information Criterion (WAIC)
First introduced in Watanabe (2010), the Watanabe-Akaike
Information Criterion (WAIC) gives an asymptotically cor-
rect estimate of the gap between the training set and test
set expectations. If we had access to samples from the
true Bayesian posterior of a model, we could compute a
corrected version of the expected log (Watanabe, 2009)1:
WAIC(x) = Eθ[log pθ(x)]−Varθ [log pθ(x)] (1)
The correction term subtracts the variance in likelihoods
across independent samples from the posterior. This acts
to robustify our estimate, ensuring that points that are sen-
sitive to the particular choice of posterior parameters are
penalized.
In this work we do not have exact posterior samples, so we
instead utilize independently trained model instances as a
proxy for posterior samples, following (Lakshminarayanan
et al., 2017). Being trained with Stochastic Gradient De-
scent (SGD), the independent models in the ensemble act as
approximate posterior samples (Mandt et al., 2017).
3.2. Does WAIC Address Typicality?
Although WAIC can protect models against likelihood es-
timation errors, we show via a toy model that it should not
1 Note that in this work we form a robust measure of what
Watanabe calls the Gibbs loss (Eθ[log pθ(x)]), which while dis-
tinct from the Bayes loss (logEθ[pθ(x)]) has the same gap asymp-
totically (Watanabe, 2009).
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be able to distinguish whether a point is in the typical set.
We illustrate this phenomena in Figure 2 on ensembles of
Gaussians fitted to samples from an isotropic Gaussian with
leave-one-out cross validation. Like likelihoods, the WAIC
measure also decreases monotonically from the origin.
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Figure 2. WAIC estimated using Jackknife resampling of data
points drawn from an isotropic Gaussian, for an ensemble of size
N = 10. Lines correspond to a dimensionality of the data.
Given that SVHN latent codes lie interior to the CIFAR-10
annulus (Figure 1), WAIC should fail to distinguish SVHN
as OoD. To our surprise, we show in Figure 3 and Table 1
that not only does WAIC reject SVHN as OoD, but it outper-
forms a baseline that does test for typicality by measuring
the Euclidean distance to the origin!
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Figure 3. We use ensembles of generative models to implement
the Watanabe-Akaike Information Criterion (WAIC), which com-
bines density estimation with uncertainty estimation. Histograms
correspond to predictions over test sets from each dataset.
Glow models ought to map the training distribution (CIFAR-
10) to a distribution whose probability mass is concentrated
in an annulus of radius
√
3072(≈ 55.4), but as we show in
Figure 4, the Glow model actually maps CIFAR, SVHN, and
Celeb-A to annuli whose mean radii span the range 42− 54.
In our experiments, the variance of radii across models is
larger for SVHN and Celeb-A than CIFAR-10, allowing
the WAIC metric to correctly identify these as anomalies
despite prior hypotheses that WAIC is insufficient.
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Figure 4. Histogram of euclidean norms in latent space. Glow
models map CIFAR-10, SVHN, and Celeb-A outside of the typical
set.
3.3. Generative Ensembles of GANs
We describe how to improve GAN-based anomaly detection
with ensembles. Although we cannot readily estimate WAIC
with GANs, we can still leverage the principle of epistemic
uncertainty to improve a GAN discriminator’s ability to
detect OoD inputs.
Figure 5b illustrates a simple 2D density modeling task
where individual GAN discriminators – when trained to
convergence – learn a discriminative boundary that does not
adequately capture p(x). Unsurprisingly, a discriminative
model tasked with classifying between p(x) and q(x) per-
form poorly when presented with inputs that belong to nei-
ther distribution. Despite this apparent shortcoming, GAN
discriminators are still applied to successfully to anomaly
detection problems (Schlegl et al., 2017; Deecke et al., 2018;
Kliger & Fleishman, 2018).
Unlike discriminative anomaly classifiers, which model
p(x)/q(x) for a static q(x), the generative distribution pθ(x)
of a GAN is trained jointly with the discriminator. The
likelihood ratio p(x)/pθ(x) learned by a GAN discriminator
is uniquely randomized by GAN training dynamics on θ
(Figure 5b). By training an ensemble of GANs, we can
recover an (unnormalized) approximation of p(x) via deci-
sion boundaries between p(x) and randomly sampled pθ(x)
(Figure 5c). We implement an anomaly detector using the
variance of the discriminator logit, and show that although
ensembling GANs lead to far more effective OoD detection
than a single GAN (Supplemental Material), it does not
outperform our WAIC-based Generative Ensembles.
4. Experimental Results
Following the experiments proposed by (Liang et al., 2018)
and (Alemi et al., 2018b), we train OoD models on MNIST,
Fashion MNIST, CIFAR-10 datasets, and evaluate anomaly
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5. In this toy example, we learn generative models for a 2D
multivariate normal with identity covariance centered at (5, 5). (a)
Explicit density models such as Normalizing Flows concentrate
probability mass at the data distribution (b) Four independently
trained GANs learn random discriminative boundaries, each corre-
sponding to a different implied generator distribution. To ensure
that the GAN discriminators form a clear discriminative boundary
between p(x) and pθ(x), we train the discriminators an additional
10k steps to convergence. Each of these boundaries fails to enclose
the true data distribution. (c) Predictive uncertainty over an ensem-
ble of discriminators “fences in” the shared, low-variance region
corresponding to p(x).
detection on test samples from other datasets. Source code
for VAE and GAN experiments are located at https:
//github.com/hschoi1/rich_latent, and code
for reproducing ODIN baselines are located at https:
//github.com/ericjang/odin.
We approximate likelihoods with two kinds of models,
which we abbreviate as pθ(x) in Table 1. For MNIST and
FashionMNIST, we estimate log pθ(x) using a 16-sample
Importance-Weighted AutoEncoder (IWAE) bound, and for
CIFAR-10, we compute exact densities via Glow (Kingma
& Dhariwal, 2018). We follow the protocol as suggested by
(Lakshminarayanan et al., 2017) to use 5 models with differ-
ent parameter initializations, and train them independently
on the full training set with no bootstrapping. For VAE archi-
tectures we also evaluate the rate term DKL(qθ(z|x)‖p(z)),
which corresponds to information loss between the latent
inference distribution and prior (Alemi et al., 2018b). Glow
uses a fixed isotropic Gaussian latent distribution, so we
also devise a “typicality-aware baseline” that measures the
euclidean distance ‖d‖ to the closet point on a hypersphere
of radius
√
3072. Finally, we report GAN-based anomaly
detection in Appendix B. We extend the VAE example code2
from Tensorflow Probability (Dillon et al., 2017) to use a
Masked Autoregressive Flow prior (Papamakarios et al.,
2017), and train the model for 5k steps: The encoder con-
sists of 5 convoluton layers. The decoder consists of 6
deconvolution layers followed by a convolution layer, and
is trained using maximum likelihood under independent
2https://github.com/
tensorflow/probability/blob/
6dfeb4ba7a5164fe4617e4967b168640109221c9/
tensorflow_probability/examples/vae.py
Bernoullis. We use a flexible learned prior pθ(z) in our VAE
experiments, but did not observe a significant performance
difference compared to the default mixture prior in the base
VAE code sample. We use an alternating chain of 6 MAF
bijectors and 6 random permutation bijectors. Models are
trained with Adam (α = 1e−3) with cosine decay on learn-
ing rate. Each Glow model uses the default implementation
and training parameters from the Tensor2Tensor project
(Vaswani et al., 2018) and is trained for 200k steps on a
single GPU.
The baseline methods, ODIN and VIB, are dependent on a
classification task and learn from the joint distribution of im-
ages and labels, while our methods use only images. For the
VIB baseline, we use the rate term as the threshold variable.
The experiments in (Alemi et al., 2018b) make use of (28,
28, 5) “location-aware” features concatenated to the model
inputs, to assist in distinguishing spatial inhomogeneities
in the data. In this work we train vanilla generative models
with no special modifications, so we also train VIB with-
out location-aware features. For CIFAR-10 experiments, we
train VIB for 26 epochs and converge at 75.7% classification
accuracy on the test set. All other experimental parameters
for VIB are identical to those in (Alemi et al., 2018b).
Despite being trained without labels, our methods – in par-
ticular Generative Ensembles – outperform ODIN and VIB
on most OoD tasks. The VAE rate term is robust to adver-
sarial inputs on the IWAE, because the FGSM perturbation
primarily minimizes the (larger) distortion component of
the variational lower bound. The performance of VAE rate
versus VIB also suggests that latent codes learned from
generative objectives are more useful for OoD detection
that latent codes learned via a classification-specific objec-
tive. Surprisingly, despite not being a general estimate of
typicality, WAIC dramatically outperforms the ‖d‖ baseline.
We present in Figure 6 images from OoD datasets with the
smallest and largest WAICs, respectively. Models trained on
FashionMNIST tend to assign higher likelihoods to straight,
vertical objects like “1’s” and pants. It is not altogether sur-
prising that AUROC scores on on the HFlip transformation
was low, given that many pants, dresses are symmetric.
4.1. Credit Card Anomaly Detection
We consider the problem of detecting fraudulent credit
card transactions from the Kaggle Credit Fraud Challenge
(Dal Pozzolo et al., 2015). A conventional approach to fraud
detection is to include a small fraction of fraudulent trans-
actions in the training set, and then learn a discriminative
classifier. Instead, we treat fraud detection as an anomaly de-
tection problem where only normal credit card transactions
are available at training time. This is motivated by realistic
test scenarios, where an adversary is hardly restricted to
generating data identically distributed to the training set.
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Table 1. We train models on MNIST, Fashion MNIST, and CIFAR-
10 and compare OoD classification ability to baseline methods us-
ing the threshold-independent Area Under ROC curve metric (AU-
ROC). pθ(x) is a single-model likelihood approximation (IWAE
for VAE, log-density for Glow). WAIC is the Watanabe-Akaike
Information Criterion as estimated by the Generative Ensemble.
ODIN results reproduced from (Liang et al., 2018). Best results
for each task shown in bold.
OOD ODIN VIB RATE pθ(x) WAIC
MNIST VAE
OMNIGLOT 100 97.1 99.1 97.9 98.5
NOTMNIST 98.2 98.6 99.9 100 100
FASHIONMNIST N/A 85.0 100 100 100
UNIFORM 100 76.6 100 100 100
GAUSSIAN 100 99.2 100 100 100
HFLIP N/A 63.7 60.0 84.1 85.0
VFLIP N/A 75.1 61.8 80.0 81.3
ADV N/A N/A 100 0 100
FASHIONMNIST VAE
OMNIGLOT N/A 94.3 83.2 56.8 79.6
NOTMNIST N/A 89.6 92.8 92.0 98.7
MNIST N/A 94.1 87.1 42.3 76.6
UNIFORM N/A 79.6 99.0 100 100
GAUSSIAN N/A 89.3 100 100 100
HFLIP N/A 66.7 53.4 59.4 62.4
VFLIP N/A 90.2 58.6 66.8 74.0
ADV N/A N/A 100 0.1 100
OOD ODIN VIB ‖d‖ pθ(x) WAIC
CIFAR-10 GLOW
CELEBA 85.7 73.5 22.9 75.6 99.7
SVHN 89.9 52.8 74.4 7.5 100
IMAGENET32 98.5 70.1 12.3 93.8 95.6
UNIFORM 99.9 54.0 100 100 100
GAUSSIAN 100 45.8 100 100 100
HFLIP 50.1 50.6 46.2 50.1 50.0
VFLIP 84.2 51.2 44.0 50.6 50.4
We compare single likelihood models (16-sample IWAE)
and Generative Ensembles (ensemble variance of IWAE)
to a binary classifier baseline that has access to a training
set of fraudulent transactions in Table 2. The classifier
baseline is a fully-connected network with 2 hidden ReLU
layers of 512 units, and is trained using a weighted sigmoid
cross entropy loss (positive weight=580) with Dropout and
RMSProp (α = 1e−5). The VAE encoder and decoder are
fully connected networks with single hidden layers (32 and
30 units, respectively) and trained using Adam (α = 1e−3).
Unsurprisingly, the classifier baseline performs best because
fraudulent test samples are distributed identically to fraud-
ulent training samples. Even so, the single-model density
estimation and Generative Ensemble achieve reasonable
results.
Figure 6. Left: lowest WAIC for each evaluation dataset. Right:
highest WAIC for each evaluation dataset.
4.2. Failure Analysis
In this section we discuss the experiments in which Genera-
tive Ensembles performed poorly, and suggest simple fixes
to address these issues.
In our early experiments, we found that a VAE trained on
Fashion MNIST performed poorly on all OoD datasets when
using pθ(x) and WAIC metrics. This was surprising, since
the same metrics performed well when the same VAE archi-
tecture was trained on MNIST. To explain this phenomenon,
we show in Figure 7 inputs and VAE-decoded outputs from
Fashion MNIST and MNIST test sets. Fashion MNIST im-
ages are reconstructed properly, while MNIST images are
are barely recognizable after decoding.
A VAEs training objective can be interpreted as the sum of
a pixel-wise autoencoding loss (distortion) and a “semantic”
loss (rate). Even though Fashion MNIST appears to be bet-
ter reconstructed in a semantic sense, the distortion values
between the FashionMNIST and MNIST test datasets are
numerically quite similar, as shown in Figure 7. Distortion
terms make up the bulk of the IWAE predictions in our mod-
els, thus explaining why pθ(x) was not very discriminative
when classifying OoD MNIST examples.
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Figure 7. Top: Inputs and decoded outputs from a VAE trained on Fashion MNIST(β = 1) for Fashion MNIST (left) and MNIST (right).
Although Fashion MNIST inputs appear to be better reconstructed (suggesting higher likelihoods), they have comparable distortions to
MNIST. The bottom row shows that Fashion MNIST and MNIST test samples have comparable rate-distortion scatter plots and IWAE
histograms. This results in poor OoD detection of MNIST on Fashion MNIST images, which is mitigated by training with β = .1 to
encourage better auto-encoding.
(Higgins et al., 2017) propose β-VAE, a simple mod-
ification to the standard VAE objective: p(x|z) + β ·
DKL(qθ(z|x)‖p(z)). β controls the relative balance be-
tween rate and distortion terms during training. Setting
β < 1 is a commonly prescribed fix for encouraging VAEs
to approach the “autoencoding limit” and avoid posterior
collapse (Alemi et al., 2018a). At test time, this results
in higher-fidelity autoencoding at the expense of higher
rates, which seems to be a more useful signal for identifying
outliers than the total pixel distortion (also suggested by
Table 1, column 4). Re-training the ensemble with β = .1
encourages a higher distortion penalty during training, and
thereby fixes the OoD detection model.
Table 2. Comparison of density-based anomaly detection ap-
proaches to a classification baseline on the Kaggle Credit Card
Fraud Dataset. The test set consists of 492 fraudulent transac-
tions and 492 normal transactions. Threshold-independent metrics
include False Positives at 95% True Positives (FPR@95%TPR),
Area Under ROC (AUROC), and Average Precision (AP). Density-
based models (Single IWAE, WAIC) are trained only on normal
credit card transactions, while the classifier is trained on normal
and fraudulent transactions. Arrows denote the direction of better
scores.
METHOD FPR@95%TPR ↓ AUROC ↑ AP ↑
CLASSIFIER 4.0 99.1 99.3
SINGLE IWAE 15.7 94.6 92.0
WAIC 15.2 94.7 92.1
5. Discussion and Future Work
Out-of-Distribution (OoD) detection is a critical piece of
infrastructure for ML applications where the test data dis-
tribution is not known at training time. Our paper has two
main contributions. The more straightforward one is a novel
technique for OoD detection in which ensembles of genera-
tive models can be used to estimate WAIC. We perform a
comparison to prior techniques published in OoD literature
to show that it is competitive with past models and argue for
why OoD detection should be done model-free.
The other contribution is the intriguing observation that
WAIC shouldnt work! It has been established in the liter-
ature (Nalisnick et al., 2018; Hendrycks et al., 2018) that
likelihood alone is not sufficient for determining whether
data is out of distribution. Simply put, regions with high
likelihood are not necessarily regions with high probability
mass. It is premature, however, to invoke this explanation as
the sole reason generative models trained on CIFAR-10 fail
to identify SVHN as OoD, as we show, e pur si muove, that
robust likelihood measures like WAIC can distinguish the
samples correctly. As we show in Figure 4, the maximum
likelihood objective typically used in flow-based models
forces the training distribution (CIFAR-10) towards the re-
gion of maximum likelihood in latent space. We hypothesize
that these datasets are quite different, different enough that
the SVHN images likelihoods can be very sensitive to the
initial conditions and architectural hyperparameters of the
trained generative models. The surprising effectiveness of
WAIC motivates further investigation into robust measures
of typicality which incorporate both likelihood as well as
some notion of local volume, as it is clear that there is an
WAIC, but Why? Generative Ensembles for Robust Anomaly Detection
incomplete theoretical understanding within the research
community of the limits of likelihood based OOD detection.
Furthermore, the observation that CIFAR-10 is mapped to
an annulus of radius <
√
3072 is in itself quite disturb-
ing, as it suggests that better flow-based generative models
(for sampling) can be obtained by encouraging the training
distribution to overlap better with the typical set in latent
space.
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A. Terminology and Abbreviations
p(x) Training data distribution
q(x) OoD data distribution
pθ(x) Learned approximation of true distribution with parameters
θ. May be implicitly specified, i.e. a fully-observed density
model
qθ(x) Learned approximation of OoD distribution with parameters
θ. May be implicitly specified, i.e. via a GAN discriminator
that learns p(x)/qθ(x)
OoD Input Out-of-Distribution Input. Invalid input to a ML model
Anomaly Synonym with OoD Input
Epistemic Uncertainty Variance in a model’s predictive distribution arising from
ignorance of true model parameters for a given input
Aleatoric Uncertainty Variance in a model’s predictive distribution arising from
inherent, irreducible noise in the inputs
Predictive Uncertainty Variance of a model’s predictive distribution, which takes
into account all of the above
MNIST Dataset of handwritten digits (size: 28x28)
FashionMNIST Dataset of clothing thumbnails (size: 28x28)
CIFAR-10 Dataset of color images (size: 32x32x3)
GAN Generative Adversarial Network. See (Goodfellow et al.,
2014)
FSGM Fast Sign Gradient Method
WGAN Wasserstein GAN. See (Arjovsky et al., 2017)
VAE Variational Autoencoder. See (Kingma & Welling, 2014;
Rezende et al., 2014)
Rate DKL(qθ(z|x)‖p(z)) term in the VAE objective. Information
loss between encoder distribution and prior over latent code
IWAE Importance Weighted Autoencoder
GLOW A generative model based on normalizing flows. See
(Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018)
ODIN Out-of-DIstribution detector for Neural networks. See
(Liang et al., 2018)
VIB Variational Information Bottleneck. See (Alemi et al.,
2018b)
WAIC Watanabe-Akaike Information Criterion. See (Watanabe,
2010)
AUROC Area Under ROC Curve
FPR@95%TPR False Positives at 95% True Positives
AP Average Precision
B. OoD Detection with GAN Discriminators
For MNIST, Fashion MNIST, and CIFAR-10 datasets, we train WGANs and fine tune the discriminators on stationary
p(x) and pθ(x). Table 3 shows that ensemble variance of the discriminators, Var(D). Our WGAN model’s generator
and discriminator share the same architecture with the VAE decoder and encoder, respectively. The discriminator has an
additional linear projection layer to its prediction of the Wasserstein metric. We train all WGAN models for 20k generator
updates. To ensureD represents a meaningful discriminative boundary between the two distributions, we freeze the generator
and fine-tune the discriminator for an additional 4k steps on stationary p(x) and pθ(x). For CIFAR-10 WGAN experiments,
we change the first filter size in the discriminator from 7 to 8.
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Table 3. We train models on MNIST, Fashion MNIST, and CIFAR-10 and compare OoD classification ability to one another using the
threshold-independent Area Under ROC curve metric (AUROC). D corresponds to single WGAN discriminators with 4k fine-tuning steps
on stationary p(x), qθ(x). Var(D) is uncertainty estimated by an ensemble of discriminators. Rate is the DKL term in the VAE objective.
Best results for each task shown in bold.
OOD D VAR(D)
MNIST
OMNIGLOT 52.7 81.2
NOTMNIST 92.7 99.8
FASHION MNIST 81.5 100
UNIFORM 93.9 100
GAUSSIAN 0.8 100
HFLIP 44.5 60.0
VFLIP 46.1 61.8
ADV 0.7 100
FASHIONMNIST
OMNIGLOT 19.1 83.2
NOTMNIST 17.9 92.8
MNIST 45.1 87.1
UNIFORM 0 99.0
GAUSSIAN 0 100
HFLIP 54.7 53.4
VFLIP 67.2 58.6
ADV 0 100
CIFAR-10
CELEBA 57.2 74.4
SVHN 68.3 62.3
IMAGENET32 49.1 62.6
UNIFORM 100 100
GAUSSIAN 100 100
HFLIP 51.6 51.3
VFLIP 59.2 52.8
C. VAE Architectural Details
We use a flexible learned prior pθ(z) in our VAE experiments, but did not observe a significant performance difference
compared to the default mixture prior in the base VAE code sample. We use an alternating chain of 6 MAF bijectors and 6
random permutation bijectors. Each MAF bijector uses TensorFlow Probability’s default implementation with the following
parameter:
s h i f t a n d l o g s c a l e f n = t f b . m a s k e d a u t o r e g r e s s i v e d e f a u l t t e m p l a t e (
h i d d e n l a y e r s =(512 , 5 1 2 ) )
Models are trained with Adam (α = 1e−3) with cosine decay on learning rate.
